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In everyday life, our choices are either based on personal experience or on information provided
by our neighborhood. In the latter case, our choices conform to those of the majority of the
agents in our neighborhood. Such herding behavior may be very efficient in aggregating disperse
private information, thereby revealing the optimal choice. However if the majority relies on herding,
this mechanism may dramatically fail to aggregate correctly the information, causing the majority
adopting the wrong choice. We address these issues in a simple model of interacting agents who aim
at giving a correct forecast of a public variable, either seeking private information or resorting to
herding. As the fraction of herders increases, the model features a phase transition beyond which a
state where most agents make the correct forecast coexists with one where most of them are wrong.
Simple strategic considerations suggest that indeed such a system of agents self-organizes deep in
the coexistence region. There, agents tend to agree much more among themselves than with what
they aim at forecasting, as found in recent empirical studies.
Information affects in many subtle ways socio-
economic behavior, giving rise to non-trivial collective
phenomena. For example, a key function of markets
is that of aggregating the information scattered among
traders into prices. However, if traders rely on the in-
formation conveyed by prices, this same mechanism may
lead to self-sustaining speculative bubbles. Likewise, we
deduce the worth of a restaurant or the importance of
a research subject from its crowdedness or popularity.
However, popularity can consecrate even totally random
choices [1].
Collective herding phenomena in general pose quite
interesting problems in statistical physics. To name a
few examples, anomalous fluctuations in financial mar-
kets and opinion dynamics have been related to perco-
lation theory based models of herding [2, 3, 4, 5] and
social changes have been shown to follow patterns which
are well explained by the theory of random field Ising
models [6]. It is natural to expect herding behavior in
cases when it is convenient for the individuals to follow
the herd. For example, when the majority is buying in
the stock market, prices goes up, hence buying becomes
the right thing to do (at least in the short run). If a
technology (e.g. fax machine) is widely adopted, it be-
comes more convenient to adopt it. Herding takes place
even in cases where agents’ behavior does not influence
the outcome, if agents try to infer information about the
optimal choice from the actions of others. Ref. [1] dis-
cussed how these considerations are important for issues
ranging from the prevalence of crime, marketing, fads
and fashions to the onset of protests such as that lead-
ing to the collapse of the East German regime. Ref. [7]
remarks that herding might explain why financial fore-
casters tend to make very similar predictions – whose
diversity is much smaller than the prediction’s error.
From the theoretical side, the onset of herding and
the resulting failure of information aggregation has been
shown to occur in models of information cascades [1].
The prototype example is that of a set of agents who
have to chose one of two restaurants on the basis of some
private noisy information. If each of them chooses simul-
taneously according to his/her private signal, the major-
ity will chose the best restaurant. However if agents take
choices one after the other and each can observe what
others have chosen before, the result changes dramati-
cally. From a certain point onward, the behavior of the
majority provides more information than that of private
signal, hence it is optimal for agents to follow the major-
ity, disregarding their private signal. As a result, choices
disclose no further information and there is a sizeable
probability that they all enter the worse restaurant.
In this letter, we show that information herding can
bring to non trivial collective phenomena even when
agents observe a finite number of peers and act in no par-
ticular order. In particular, a population of selfish agents
fails to correctly aggregate information because herding
brings the system into a coexistence region, where the
vast majority of agents “agrees” on the same forecast,
not necessarily the right one. A statistical mechanics ap-
proach gives a detailed account of the results in terms of
a zero temperature Ising model with asymmetric inter-
action. These insights extend to the case where agents
have to forecast a variable in a continuous interval. Again
we find a spinodal point beyond which forecasts tend to
cluster, as observed in Ref. [7].
Let us consider a population of agents who have to
forecast the value of a binary event E ∈ {±1}. Each
agent i = 1, . . . , N faces the choice of either looking for
information or herding. We shall denote by I and H,
respectively, these two strategies, as well as the set of
agents who follow them. In the former case agent i ∈ I
receives a signal fi which is draw with P{fi = E} = p =
1 − P{fi = −E}, independently for each agent i ∈ I.
We assume that the signal fi is informative about E, i.e.
p > 1/2. In the case of strategyH, agent i forms a sample
group Gi by picking an odd number K of other agents
at random, observes their forecasts fj and sets his/her
forecast to that of the majority of agents j ∈ Gi. Notice
first that j ∈ Gi – i.e. i observing j – does not imply that
i ∈ Gj – i.e. that j observes i. Secondly, the forecast of
2i may depend on the forecast of other agents who are
themselves herding. Hence we assume that forecasts are
formed by an iterative process
f
(τ+1)
i = sign
∑
j∈Gi
f
(τ)
j , ∀i ∈ H (1)
where f (0)j is drawn at random with P{f (0)j = ±1} =
1/2 for all j ∈ H and f (τ)j = fj stays constant for all
j ∈ I. We denote simply by fj the fixed point value of
the forecast resulting from this process. Both strategies
imply a cost, which for simplicity we assume to be the
same: either agents invest in information seeking or in
forming a sample group. In other words, agents have
access to either type of information but not both. We
assume that the goal of agents is that of reaching a correct
forecast, i.e. that the payoff of agent i is the probability
P{fi = E} that his/her forecast is right. By definition,
P{fi = E|i ∈ I} = p, whereas the probability that an
herding agent forecasts the correct outcome is
q =
1
ηN
∑
i∈H
δfi,E . (2)
where we introduced the fraction η of agents who follow
the H strategy.
Let us first focus on the case where the fraction η of
agents i ∈ H is fixed and then move to the case where
this is fixed by agents’ optimizing behavior. The inset of
Fig. 1 shows the behavior of q as a function of η in typical
numerical simulations. The average 〈q〉 of q over differ-
ent realizations is reported in Fig. 1. When η is small,
herding is quite efficient and it yields more accurate pre-
dictions than information seeking (〈q〉 > p). Actually
the probability 〈q〉 that H-players end up with the cor-
rect forecast increases with η up to a maximum. This
is because herders use the information of other herders
who have themselves a higher performance than private
information forecasters. However beyond a certain point,
outcomes with a value q < p start to appear, coexisting
with outcomes with q ≈ 1. Consequently the average
〈q〉 starts decreasing. The low q state becomes more and
more probable as η increases, and for η close to one we
find 〈q〉 < p.
In order to shed light on the above results, let us notice
that the probability of a randomly drawn agent to give
the right forecast is
P{fi = E} ≡ pi = (1− η)p+ ηq. (3)
In order to derive an equation for q we observe that a
herding agent adopts the point of view of the majority of
his K randomly drawn agents, i.e.
q = ΣK(pi) ≡
K∑
g=(K+1)/2
(
K
g
)
pig(1− pi)K−g (4)
These are two self consistent equations for q. For a given
value of p, the solution is unique for η < ηc(p,K) whereas
for η > ηc(p,K), as shown in Fig. 1, we find three so-
lutions, which we denote by q+ > qu > q−. The critical
point ηc increases with p and with K.
A direct calculation shows that the average number
of fixed points of Eqs. (1) is dominated by configura-
tions {fi} for which q satisfies Eqs. (3,4). Interest-
ingly, we find that the average number of fixed points
N ' (KKe−K/K!)ηN [p(1−p)]−(1−η)N is the same on all
the solutions. Linear stability of the dynamics (1), how-
ever, shows that the fixed points q± are stable whereas
the one at qu is unstable. The unstable solution qu sepa-
rates the basin of attraction of the fixed points q±. This
allows us to estimate the probability p− that the system
converges to the fixed point q−, which is the probability
that the initial value of q(0) falls below qu. Given that
variables f (0)i are assigned a random sign for i ∈ H, q(0)
is well approximated by a gaussian variable of mean zero
and variance 1/(ηN). Hence
p− ≡ P{q(0) < qu} ∼= 12erfc
(√
ηN/2(1− 2qu)
)
. (5)
The expected value of q is then given by
〈q〉 = p−q− + (1− p−)q+. (6)
Fig. 1 shows that Eq. (6) agrees very well with numerical
simulations for large N . The discrepancy for small N
comes from the fact that indeed the dynamics of q(τ)
is subject to a noise term of order 1/
√
N which causes
transitions across qu in the early stages of the dynamics
for small N . It is easy to show that, for η ≈ 1,
qu ' 12 −
(p− 1/2)k!!
k!!− (k − 1)!! (1− η) +O(1− η)
2 (7)
which shows that there is a window of size 1/
√
N close to
η = 1 where p− is sizeable. As a consequence, the fall of
q in this region gets steeper and steeper as N increases.
This consideration is important is we analyze the be-
havior of selfish agents following game theory [8]. We
assume for simplicity that agents aim at reaching a cor-
rect forecast, i.e. that their payoff is the probability that
fi = E. As long as 〈q〉 > p agents will find it more
convenient to switch from the I to H strategy. Hence,
the fraction η of herders increases when 〈q〉 > p. The
contrary is true when 〈q〉 < p and hence we expect that
the population will self-organize to a state η∗, such that
no agent has incentive to change strategy, i.e. where
〈q〉 = p. Such a state is called a Nash equilibrium [8].
Its standard interpretation as the equilibrium of forward
looking rational agents, who correctly anticipate the be-
havior of others, given the rules of the game, and respond
optimally, requires agents who are able to solve a rather
complex statistical mechanical problem. We will however
show below that adaptive agents with limited rationality
can “learn” to converge to such a Nash equilibrium.
In the Nash equilibrium all but a fraction of order 1−
η∗ ∼ √N of agents takes the H strategy. In addition,
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FIG. 1: The average success q of herding agents is shown, for
simulations (symbols) and for the analytical solution (dotted
lines) as a function of the herding probability η for K = 11,
p = 0.55 and N = 200 (+) 103 (¤) and 104 (¦) agents. The
stable solutions q± are shown as full lines whereas the unstable
one qu is shown as a dashed line. Inset: individual realizations
of q for the same systems above.
because in this region q+ ∼= 1 and q− ∼= 0, we have p− ∼=
1− p. This means that the whole population adopts the
wrong forecast with probability 1−p, as if it were a single
individual forecasting on the basis of private information.
Such a spectacular event is similar to the outcome of
information cascades [1], but it takes place in a quite
different setting.
Does this scenario changes when we introduce het-
erogeneity in agents’ characteristics? Let us first con-
sider the case where agent i, when using strategy H,
can observe Ki peers. Na¨ıvely one would expect that
agents with larger Ki receive more precise information
and hence should prefer the H strategy. However, be-
cause at the Nash equilibrium almost every agent is mak-
ing the same prediction, either right or wrong, a larger
“window” Ki does not help. The case where agents have
different individual forecasting abilities, i.e. when pi de-
pends on i, is a bit more complex. It is reasonable to
assume that “expert” agents with pi > 〈q〉 will seek pri-
vate information whereas those with pi < 〈q〉 will herd.
Again q is given by Eqs. (3,4) with
η =
∫ 〈q〉
0
dp φ(p), (1− η)p =
∫ 1
〈q〉
dp p φ(p) (8)
where φ(p) is the distribution of pi. It is easy to show that
a solution of Eqs. (3,4,8) with q = 〈q〉, i.e. where η and
p do not fall in the coexistence region is not possible. In-
deed the only solution of ΣK [q
∫ q
dpφ(p)+
∫ 1
q
dppφ(p)] = q
is at q = 1, which implies η = 1. The solution then lies
in the coexistence region, where Eqs. (3,4) have three
solutions, and it is found computing 〈q〉 as before from
Eqs. (5,6) as a function of η and p, and then using Eq.
(8) to compute η and p self-consistently. The results are
shown in Fig. 2 for φ(p) = β2β(1 − p)β−1, p ∈ [1/2, 1].
When β is large, there is small heterogeneity and we are
back to the case pi = p: Almost all agents follow the
H strategy q ≈ 1 and the probability of a wrong fore-
cast p− ' 1/2 is large. As β decreases, the number of
“experts”, i.e. agents with pi > q increases, and corre-
spondingly also the performance of the population as a
whole improves (i.e. q increases and p− decreases). In
this region, asymptotic analysis shows that the fraction
of “experts” 1− η ∼√logN/N .
The analytical results were tested against numerical
simulations of adaptive agents who repeatedly play the
game and learn, in the course of time, about their op-
timal choice. In order to do this, agents compute the
cumulative payoff for both strategies and adopt the strat-
egy with the largest score [9]. As expected, we find that
in each run there is a value q such that all agents with
pi > q play the I strategy whereas those with pi < q
herd. Again some deviations occur for small N but the
agreement improves as N increases. This shows that the
type of equilibria we discuss are “learnable” by a pop-
ulation of not extremely sophisticated agents. It is well
known that the type of reinforcement learning dynam-
ics discussed above has close analogies with evolutionary
dynamics [10]. Hence the scenario we discussed above,
might as well describe social norms which are the result
of evolutionary processes.
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FIG. 2: Analytical results (lines) compared to numerical sim-
ulations (symbols) for systems of N = 100 and 800 agents
with heterogeneous forecasting ability pi drawn from the dis-
tribution φ(p) = β2β(1 − p)β−1. The average success q (full
line and ◦), the fraction η of herding agents (long dashed line
and ¤) and the probability p− that the majority forecasts
the wrong outcome (short dashed line and +), as a function
of β. For comparison, the thin dashed line shows the average
success of agents with no herding (η = 0).
The insights of the discrete model hold also when agents
have to forecast a continuous variable E. In order to show
this, we adopt an asymmetric version of the continuous
opinion model of Ref. [4], where a population of N agents
submits forecasts {fi} of a continuous event E ∈ [0, 1].
Again, forecasters may either seek private information
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FIG. 3: Continuous forecasting model for K = 11, d = µ =
0.5, ε = 0.1. The inverse herding parameter φ−1 is only of
the order of 0.1 for a strong herding regime near the Nash
equilibrium η ≈ 0.98. The dispersion σ and the error Σ are
only shown for N = 100. Note that ηNash increases with N
whereas φNash decreases.
(strategy I) or herd (strategy H). All I agents receive a
signal fi ∈ [0, 1] which, with probability p is “correct”,
i.e. is randomly drawn from the interval [E−², E+²], and
with probability 1 − p is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
If instead i ∈ H, we draw at random sample groups Gi
of K agents and assign initial random values f (0)i ∈ [0, 1]
to herding agents. Then we iterate the dynamics over
agents j of the the group Gi
f
(τ+1)
i = f
(τ)
i + µ(f
(τ)
j − f (τ)i ) θ
(
d− |f (τ)j − f (τ)i |
)
until |f (τ+1)i − f (τ)i | < ². We denote simply by fi the
limit value of f (τ)i in this process. Note that agent i is
influenced by j ∈ Gi only if their opinion are not too far,
i.e. if |f (τ)j − f (τ)i | < d. Forecasts are considered to be
correct if |fi − E| < ².
As in Ref. [7], we introduce the forecast error
Σ =
√
〈(f¯ − E)2〉 and the forecast dispersion σ =√
〈(fi − f¯)2〉 where ·¯ denotes the average over agents
whereas the average 〈. . .〉 is taken over different real-
izations of the process. The ratio φ = Σ/σ called the
empirical herding coefficient, is a measure of herding as
explained in ref. [7].
Fig. 3 shows the results of numerical simulations of
the model as a function of the fraction η of herders, for
a typical choice of the parameters. As in the discrete
model, we find that for small values of η the probabil-
ity q = P{|fi − E| < ²|i ∈ H} of a correct forecast for
herders is larger than that of information seeking agents
(p) and it increases because herding agents aggregate the
information of other agents who are also herding. Upon
increasing η further, q reaches a maximum and then it de-
creases as the information entering in the system dimin-
ishes. In this region, we find coexistence of a state where
the vast majority of agents are right with a state where
almost all of them are wrong. The Nash equilibrium,
where both strategy are equally successful (〈q〉 = p), is
precisely in this region and the herding coefficient attains
values φ ' 5÷ 10, which are comparable to those found
in Ref. [7] on a survey of earning forecasters of US, EU,
UK and JP stocks during the period 1987-2004. The fact
that analysts agree with each other five to ten times more
than with the actual result, was claimed to be related to
herding effects Ref. [7], a conclusion fully supported by
our results. Furthermore, as in the discrete model, the
Nash equilibrium moves towards η = 1 as N increases,
thus making herd behavior more pronounced. Our simple
model then suggests that φ should take larger values in
markets with a larger number of forecasters. This might
explain some of the differences found in Ref. [7] across
markets.
In conclusion, we introduced a simple model captur-
ing the tension between private information seeking and
exploiting information gathered by others (herding) in a
population. When few agents herd, information aggrega-
tion is very efficient. This makes herding the choice taken
by nearly the whole population, thus setting the system
deep in a “coexistence” region where the population as a
whole adopts either the right or the wrong forecast. This
scenario is rather robust and applies both to a discrete
and a continuum model and it compares well with empir-
ical findings [7]. The model and the statistical mechanics
analysis can serve as a basis to address a wide range of
related issues.
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